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fable-config

面向 AI agent harness 的配置与审计技能:先定位真正生效的配置来源与优先级,再按最小权限合并权限允许列表、环境变量、快捷键与生命周期钩子,避免明文密钥和通配符越权,并用语法校验、行为正反例验证和回滚方案证明配置确实生效。

分类:安全
imMamdouhaboammar
热度 0.00
最近更新 2026-10-23 06:04:53

安装

发给 Agent
帮我安装这个技能:npx secure-skills-cli add immamdouhaboammar/get-fable/fable-config
兼容性
通用兼容
联网要求
不联网
数据出网
数据不出本机
Metadata
name
fable-config
description
Configure and audit AI agent harness settings, permissions allowlists, environment variables, editor keybindings, and lifecycle hook integrations. Use when modifying settings.json, adjusting tool permissions, setting up environment variables, or configuring agent lifecycle hooks — even if the user does not explicitly say "fable-config" (e.g. "update settings", "allow command permissions", "configure agent hooks", "setup environment variables"). Do NOT use for application-level business configuration.
version
1.3.0
pack
system
inputs
["config_change"]
requires
["target_harness"]
produces
["settings_diff"]
gates
["valid_json","safe_permissions"]
fallback
fable-plan
mutatesWorkspace
true
parallelSafe
false
neural_links
{"precursors":["fable-plan"],"continuations":["fable-verify","get-fable"],"lateral_peers":["fable-plan"],"recovery":"fable-recover"}

Fable Config

Change harness/configuration behavior with explicit precedence, least privilege, secret-safe handling, and a verified rollback path.

Mission

Configuration is executable behavior. A syntactically valid JSON/TOML/YAML file can still disable a guard, broaden permissions, write to the wrong scope, or be ignored because another source has higher precedence.

The Skill must prove both configuration validity and effective behavior.

Activate When

  • changing host/harness settings, permissions, hooks, keybindings, model/tool config, or environment references;
  • adding/removing lifecycle enforcement;
  • troubleshooting why a setting is not taking effect;
  • configuring safe command/tool allowlists;
  • migrating configuration formats/scopes.

Do Not Activate When

  • storing raw credentials/secrets;
  • application business logic is the real change;
  • a host capability is unknown and needs research/discovery first;
  • the requested change is to weaken a safety boundary merely to bypass an error without understanding it.

Configuration Classification

Change Main risk
Permission/allowlist excessive privilege/wildcard scope
Hook registration hook exists but is never invoked / blocks wrong phase
Environment config precedence, secret leakage, type/format
Host settings wrong user/project scope, unsupported keys
Model/tool config changed behavior/cost/access unexpectedly
Keybindings/UI collision/override
Generated config manual edit overwritten by generator

Protocol

Stage 1 — Locate source and effective scope

Identify:

  • target host/version;
  • project vs user/global scope;
  • all configuration sources and precedence;
  • generated vs hand-maintained files;
  • existing user customizations to preserve.

Do not edit the first file with the right name until you know it is effective.

Stage 2 — Define desired behavior and least privilege

State exactly what capability should become allowed/blocked/triggered and what must remain unchanged.

For permissions, prefer narrow command/tool/path patterns. Wildcards need explicit justification and threat consideration.

Stage 3 — Protect secrets

Configuration may reference environment variable names or secure stores, but should not embed raw tokens/passwords/private keys unless the target's secure format explicitly requires protected encrypted storage.

If an existing secret is found in plaintext, do not echo it; route exposure handling appropriately.

Stage 4 — Make a minimal merge

Preserve unknown/user-defined settings. Avoid replacing an entire config object/file when one scoped key can be merged.

For generated config, modify source/generator then regenerate.

Stage 5 — Validate structure and semantics

Run available parser/schema/host diagnostics. Check:

  • syntax;
  • key types/enums;
  • duplicate/conflicting entries;
  • unsupported/deprecated keys;
  • permission pattern scope;
  • hook command/path existence.

Stage 6 — Prove effective behavior

A valid file is not enough. Test the configured behavior safely:

  • target command is allowed while broader command remains denied;
  • hook fires at intended lifecycle point;
  • project override wins as expected;
  • setting is visible to the target host;
  • rollback restores previous behavior.

Stage 7 — Record rollback and handoff

Capture changed source, effective scope, validation, behavioral proof, and how to revert if the host fails after restart/update.

Decision Rules

  • Preserve existing user settings not owned by the task.
  • Prefer exact allowlists over *, shell wildcards, root/global permissions.
  • A config key accepted by parser but ignored by host is not a successful change; verify effect.
  • Host integration levels differ; do not claim hooks/enforcement where the host only supports advisory rules.
  • Environment variable name may be stored; secret value should remain in secure environment/credential store.
  • If config precedence is uncertain, investigate before editing more files.
  • Do not disable security/approval checks simply because they are blocking an unsafe action.
  • If a malformed edit can lock out the host, keep a reversible backup/atomic write strategy.

Invariants

  • Least privilege is preserved or any broadening is explicit and justified.
  • Raw secrets are not introduced into repository/config logs.
  • Existing unrelated user configuration is preserved.
  • Edited source is the effective source-of-truth.
  • Syntax/schema and actual host behavior both verify.
  • Rollback is possible for material changes.

Failure Taxonomy

Precedence mismatch

Edited file is shadowed by another scope/source. Trace effective configuration.

Schema-valid but ignored

Host accepts file but does not support/use key. Verify host version/capability.

Permission overreach

Pattern allows more than requested. Narrow and test negative case.

Hook misregistration

Script exists but lifecycle never invokes it. Validate registration path/event and permissions.

Secret leakage

Credential embedded/logged. Remove safely and rotate if exposure occurred.

User-config clobber

Whole-file rewrite loses existing settings. Restore/merge surgically.

Generated drift

Manual edit is overwritten. Change generator/source instead.

Anti-Patterns

  • "allow": ["*"] to stop approval prompts;
  • editing global config when project scope suffices;
  • copying API tokens into settings examples;
  • validating JSON syntax and calling the hook configured;
  • claiming full lifecycle enforcement on a host with advisory-only integration;
  • resetting the whole config file for one key;
  • disabling security controls to make a command pass;
  • manually patching generated config.

Configuration Packet

Target host/version/scope:
Effective config sources + precedence:
Desired behavior:
Settings changed:
Permissions before/after:
Secret handling:
Syntax/schema validation:
Behavioral proof + negative case:
Preserved user settings:
Rollback:

Completion Criteria

Configuration completes when:

  • correct effective source/scope was changed minimally;
  • configuration parses and satisfies schema/capability constraints;
  • permissions remain least-privilege;
  • secrets/unrelated settings remain safe;
  • target behavior is empirically observed, including important negative case;
  • rollback and host limitations are explicit.

Progressive Resources

  • Deep guide: references/config-precedence-permissions-and-hooks.md
  • Existing rules: references/harness-configuration-rules.md
  • Example: examples/configure-allowlist.md