MCP Best Practices
Decision reference for building production MCP servers with the TypeScript SDK. Not a tutorial - assumes you already have a working server and need to make it correct, fast, and secure.
Quick Reference
| Component | Current | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Spec (released) | 2026-07-28 (specification) | Stateless/sessionless overhaul - see "Spec 2026-07-28" below and references/spec-2026-07-28.md |
| Spec (still deployed) | 2025-11-25 | Still the bulk of deployed software and the TS client default - but Claude Code now negotiates 2026-07-28 with HTTP servers that offer it |
| TS SDK (current) | v2.3.1 (2026-10-05): /server, /client, /core 2.3.1; /node 2.1.1, /express + /hono 2.0.2, /fastify 2.0.1 (no longer lockstep) |
createMcpHandler serves both eras by default; the client speaks 2025-era unless told otherwise |
| TS SDK (legacy) | v1.32.1 (@modelcontextprotocol/sdk) |
Bug + security fixes for >=6 months after v2 GA, never a revision past 2025-11-25; source on the v1.x branch |
| JSON Schema | 2020-12 default (2019-09 / draft-07 accepted since v2.0.0) | - |
| Transport | Streamable HTTP (remote), stdio (local) | SSE + WebSocket removed in v2 |
| Extensions | MCP Apps (Stable, SEP-1865), Auth Extensions (official), Tasks (ext-tasks) | Domain-specific WGs |
| Registry | Preview with v0.1 API freeze since 2025-10-24 (registry) | GA pending |
v2 imports (current):
import { McpServer } from "@modelcontextprotocol/server";
import { WebStandardStreamableHTTPServerTransport } from "@modelcontextprotocol/server";
import { ProtocolError, ProtocolErrorCode } from "@modelcontextprotocol/core";
v1 imports (legacy line, still widely deployed):
import { McpServer } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/mcp.js";
import { WebStandardStreamableHTTPServerTransport } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/webStandardStreamableHttp.js";
import { StdioServerTransport } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/stdio.js";
The Two Eras
The most decision-relevant fact after the 2026-07-28 release: upgrading the TS SDK does not move your client to the new spec, but other SDKs and clients do not share that default. rmcp (Rust) >= 3.0 advertises 2026-07-28 out of the box, so a dependency bump can silently put a server on the modern wire - re-check which revisions you advertise after every SDK upgrade.
Every revision from 2024-10-07 through 2025-11-25 opens with initialize and shares one wire behavior - the SDK calls that family legacy. 2026-07-28 starts the modern era: no initialize, a server/discover advertisement instead, a _meta envelope on every request. Selection is explicit:
versionNegotiation.mode |
Behavior |
|---|---|
absent / 'legacy' |
The 2025 initialize handshake, byte for byte. No probe. This is the default. |
'auto' |
Probe with server/discover; fall back to initialize against a 2025-only server |
{ pin: '2026-07-28' } |
That revision or nothing - a pin never falls back |
Servers: serve both eras. Claude Code's current MCP runtime asks HTTP servers whether they support 2026-07-28 and uses it when they do (stdio is rolling out), so a server that advertises modern support gets modern traffic from a mainstream client today. v2's createMcpHandler serves 2025-era requests alongside modern ones by default (legacy: 'stateless'); test both eras. The stateless design guidance throughout this skill is what makes that cheap.
Tooling: SDK docs (v2); MCP Inspector, which connects as legacy by default - pass --protocol-era modern (see "Testing Against Each Era" in references/spec-2026-07-28.md); the conformance suite; and the mcp-server-dev plugin for scaffolding.
Server Setup
Transport Decision
| Scenario | Transport | Key Config |
|---|---|---|
| Remote, v2 (K8s, CF Workers, Node) | createMcpHandler(factory) |
Serves both eras; stateless per request |
| Remote, v1 / stateless | WebStandardStreamableHTTPServerTransport |
sessionIdGenerator: undefined, enableJsonResponse: true |
| Remote, stateful (2025-era only) | WebStandardStreamableHTTPServerTransport |
sessionIdGenerator: () => randomUUID() |
| Local CLI / Claude Desktop | StdioServerTransport / v2 serveStdio(factory) |
Default |
| Legacy SSE clients | SSE removed in v2 - migrate to Streamable HTTP | - |
Stateless Pattern (recommended for remote deployment)
A fresh server per request is the canonical pattern - and since server@2.3.0 it is enforced: "An app that uses one server object, or one stateless transport, for every HTTP request fails on the second request after this upgrade." Sharing instances also leaked cross-client data below v1.26.0 (GHSA-345p-7cg4-v4c7). On v2, createMcpHandler takes a factory and calls it once per request:
import { createMcpHandler, hostHeaderValidationResponse, McpServer, originValidationResponse } from "@modelcontextprotocol/server";
const handler = createMcpHandler(() => {
const server = new McpServer({ name: "my-server", version: "1.0.0" });
registerTools(server); // register tools, resources, prompts inside the factory
return server;
});
export default {
async fetch(request: Request): Promise<Response> {
// createMcpHandler is deliberately validation-free: guard Host/Origin in front of it.
const rejected =
hostHeaderValidationResponse(request, ["mcp.example.com"]) ??
originValidationResponse(request, ["app.example.com"]);
return rejected ?? handler.fetch(request);
},
};
On v1 the same shape is a new McpServer + WebStandardStreamableHTTPServerTransport({ sessionIdGenerator: undefined, enableJsonResponse: true }) per request, connect(), handleRequest(), then close() both in a finally - see references/transport-patterns.md.
The McpServer must be per-request, but its constant inputs must not be. Hoist to module level: Zod schemas, annotation objects ({ readOnlyHint: true, ... }), tool description strings, payment configs, upstream API clients. (v2.3.0 also converts tool schemas lazily, so a per-request server no longer re-converts every tool on every request.)
If you only route POST (the common stateless layout), answer GET /mcp with an explicit 405 Method Not Allowed - the spec requires it when no SSE stream is offered, and the official TS client reads 405 as the benign no-stream signal, while an empty 200 sends it into a reconnect storm.
For transports, sessions, HTTP/2 gotchas, and K8s deployment: see
references/transport-patterns.md
Framework Integration
handler.fetch is web-standard, so Workers, Deno, Bun and Hono need no adapter. For Express, createMcpExpressApp(options) returns an express() app with JSON parsing and DNS-rebinding protection; mount the handler with toNodeHandler(handler) from @modelcontextprotocol/node. createMcpHonoApp(options) is the Hono equivalent. On Cloudflare Workers call preloadSchemas() at module scope - v2's workerd build does it automatically. Examples: references/transport-patterns.md.
Tool Design
Registration API
v1 (legacy line) - server.tool(name, description, zodShape, annotations, handler). Positional overloads are ambiguous; same fields as v2 below minus outputSchema. Removed entirely in v2.
v2 (current) - registerTool() with config object:
server.registerTool("search_docs", {
title: "Document Search",
description: "Search documents by keyword or phrase",
inputSchema: z.object({
query: z.string().describe("Search query"),
max_results: z.number().optional().describe("Max results (default 20)"),
}),
outputSchema: z.object({
results: z.array(z.object({ id: z.string(), text: z.string() })),
has_more: z.boolean(),
}),
annotations: { readOnlyHint: true, destructiveHint: false, idempotentHint: true, openWorldHint: true },
}, async ({ query, max_results }) => {
const result = await fetchDocs(query, max_results);
return {
// Both channels carry IDENTICAL bytes. Divergent payloads = the text block
// silently vanishes on Claude Code/Codex/Copilot. See "Tool Result Delivery" below.
structuredContent: result,
content: [{ type: "text", text: JSON.stringify(result) }],
};
});
Naming
Spec 2025-11-25 (SHOULD, not MUST): 1-128 chars, case-sensitive, A-Za-z0-9_-. only. DO: search_docs, get_user_profile, admin.tools.list. DON'T: search (generic names collide across servers), Search Docs (spaces disallowed). Service-prefix (github_*, jira_*) when multiple servers are active - LLMs confuse generic names. Bake the prefix into the tool name itself: the spec is explicit that "The server name (from serverInfo) is not guaranteed to be unique across servers and SHOULD NOT be relied upon for disambiguation", so an aggregator cannot derive a safe prefix for you.
Schema Rules
.describe() on every field - this is what LLMs use for argument generation. Three constructs break silently (z.union(), raw JSON Schema, z.transform()), as does client-side AJV strict validation - see "Known SDK Bugs" below.
Pagination is the primitive most servers hit first: a tools/list or resources/list with 50+ entries should paginate. The protocol cursor is opaque - never parse or synthesize it; loop until nextCursor is absent. It is distinct from in-tool offset/limit args.
Zod-to-JSON-Schema conversion rules, outputSchema/structuredContent patterns, non-text content types, the other tool-definition fields (
icons,listChanged,execution.taskSupport), and the remaining primitives (prompts, resources, resource templates, completions, cancellation): seereferences/tool-schema-guide.md
Annotations
All are optional hints (untrusted from untrusted servers per spec):
| Annotation | Default | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
readOnlyHint |
false |
Tool doesn't modify its environment |
destructiveHint |
true |
May perform destructive updates (only when readOnly=false) |
idempotentHint |
false |
Repeated calls with same args have no additional effect |
openWorldHint |
true |
Interacts with external entities (APIs, web) |
Set them accurately - clients use them for consent prompts and auto-approval decisions.
The "Lethal Trifecta": private-data access + exposure to untrusted content + external communication in one agent creates data-theft conditions (demonstrated with a malicious calendar event, an MCP calendar server, and a code-execution tool). Design tool sets so no single agent holds all three.
Stateful Tools
With no protocol-level session on 2026-07-28, cross-call state uses server-minted handles passed as ordinary tool arguments: a creation tool returns { basket_id: "bsk_a1b2c3" }, later tools take basket_id as an argument, and the model carries it forward. A handle is a name, not a capability - validate the caller against it on every call, keep it opaque with real entropy, and state its retention policy in the creation tool's description. Expired or unknown handles return a tool execution error so the model can recover by creating new state. Full rules: references/spec-2026-07-28.md.
Tool Result Delivery: content vs structuredContent
The footgun: when a tool returns BOTH a text content block and structuredContent, several major clients (Claude Code, Codex CLI, VS Code Copilot, Goose) silently drop the text block and forward only structuredContent to the model. If the two payloads differ, the human-readable one vanishes. This is client behavior the spec does not constrain - not an SDK transform. Don't return both channels expecting both to reach the model.
Empirically tested - Claude Code 2.1.165 (MCP 2025-11-25)
Measured with claude -p --output-format=stream-json, reading the exact tool_result the model received:
| Tool returns | What the model receives |
|---|---|
One text block, no structuredContent |
text verbatim |
content: [] + structuredContent |
JSON.stringify(structuredContent) as a string in the content slot - works |
text block + structuredContent |
text block silently dropped; structuredContent wins |
text + structuredContent + outputSchema |
same - outputSchema makes zero difference |
two text blocks, no structuredContent |
both preserved verbatim |
structuredContent is not a separate typed channel to the model on Claude Code - it is stringified into the standard tool_result content slot, so it costs the same tokens as the equivalent JSON-as-text. It does not buy cheaper or out-of-band structured data.
Intentional, per Anthropic maintainer (anthropics/claude-code#9962): structuredContent support landed in Claude Code v2.0.21 and "we made structuredContent the default when both formats are present... optimizing for agent performance." Reproduced across unrelated servers (Laravel, Roblox Studio, YouTube) - host-side precedence, not a server bug.
What the spec actually says (2025-11-25)
There is no precedence rule - the spec never says which field a client should prefer when both are present (Discussion #1563), and that gap is the documented root cause of client divergence. The only relevant normative line is a backwards-compat SHOULD: "a tool that returns structured content SHOULD also return the serialized JSON in a TextContent block." The official TypeScript SDK passes both fields through verbatim; any stringify-into-content you observe is the host harness, not the SDK.
Cross-client behavior (the matrix above is Claude Code only)
| Client | When both content + structuredContent present |
|---|---|
| Claude Code CLI, OpenAI Codex CLI, VS Code Copilot, Goose | shadow - only structuredContent reaches the model (text dropped) |
| Cursor, Claude.ai web, ChatGPT MCP connector | prefer content / surface both to the model |
| Google ADK (framework) | forwards both by default; content-only is opt-in |
(Non-Claude-Code rows come from issue trackers and maintainer statements, not the stream-json harness - treat exact delivery as client-version-dependent.)
The rule for server authors
- DON'T return divergent
contentandstructuredContent(e.g. a rendered ASCII table as text + different JSON as structured). On shadowing clients the text silently disappears and only the JSON reaches the model. - DO, if you emit
structuredContent, mirror the same bytes into a text block:content: [{ type: "text", text: JSON.stringify(payload) }]. This is the spec's backwards-compat SHOULD. Shadowing clients use the structured copy; others fall back to the identical text - either way the model gets the data. Mirroring does not double tokens on shadowing clients (they drop the text). - PREFER one channel per tool / per mode. For a human-readable rendering (table, summary) to reach the model, return it as text only, no
structuredContent- or expose aformat: "table" | "json"arg (table-> text-only;json-> JSON mirrored into both channels). Both are empirically valid on Claude Code and keep one channel per call. outputSchemagates client-side validation only; it does not make the text block survive on shadowing clients.
content blocks are not text-only - image, audio, resource_link, and embedded resource blocks all exist, with annotations (audience, priority, lastModified); for those and the image preview + URL pattern see references/tool-schema-guide.md.
Error Handling
Two distinct mechanisms with different LLM visibility:
| Type | LLM Sees It? | Use For |
|---|---|---|
Tool error (isError: true in CallToolResult) |
Yes - enables self-correction | Input validation, API failures, business logic errors |
| Protocol error (JSON-RPC error response) | Maybe - clients MAY expose | Unknown tool, malformed request, server crash |
Per SEP-1303 (merged into spec 2025-11-25): input validation errors MUST be tool execution errors, not protocol errors. The LLM needs to see "date must be in the future" to self-correct.
// DO: Tool execution error - LLM can self-correct
return {
isError: true,
content: [{ type: "text", text: "Date must be in the future. Current date: 2026-03-25" }],
};
// DON'T: throw for validation - you lose control of what the LLM sees
throw new ProtocolError(ProtocolErrorCode.InvalidParams, "Invalid date");
What a throw actually does: inside a tool handler the SDK converts every exception - including a thrown ProtocolError/McpError - into an isError: true result (UrlElicitationRequiredError is the one exception). The message survives; the error code and error.data are dropped, so structured data embedded there never reaches the client. Return the isError result yourself. The x402/MPP ecosystem standardized on isError: true results with structuredContent for this reason.
For full error taxonomy, code examples, payment error patterns, and why
-32042is not available as a "Payment Required" code: seereferences/error-handling.md
Resources and Instructions
Set instructions in the server constructor - a system-level hint to the LLM about how to use your server:
const server = new McpServer({
name: "docs-api",
version: "1.0.0",
instructions: "Knowledge base API. Use search_docs for full-text search, get_doc for retrieval by ID. All tools are read-only.",
});
With Claude Code's tool search on by default, only tool names and server instructions load at session start - instructions is now the main thing the model reads before it decides to load your tools. Claude Code truncates each tool description and each server's instructions at 2,048 characters; put the critical part first.
Ship guides and structured data as resources under a docs:// URI scheme (server.resource(...)) - see "Other Server Primitives" in references/tool-schema-guide.md.
Performance
Token Bloat Mitigation
Tool definitions consume context window before any conversation starts. GitHub MCP: 20,444 tokens for 80 tools (SEP-1576).
Strategies:
- 5-15 tools per server - community sweet spot. Split beyond that.
- Outcome-oriented tools - bundle multi-step operations into single tools (e.g.,
track_order(email)notget_user+list_orders+get_status). - Response granularity - return curated results, not raw API dumps. 800-token user object vs 20-token summary.
outputSchema+structuredContent- typed output for programmatic/PTC clients. Caveat: on shadowing clientsstructuredContentis stringified into the model's context at the same token cost as text - not a free out-of-band channel (see "Tool Result Delivery").- Dynamic tool loading - register only relevant tool subsets per request context (e.g. a
?tools=search,fetchquery param). Pair withlistChangedif the set changes mid-session. Vary the set per connection, not mid-conversation: tool definitions sit in the prompt prefix, and "Adding or removing tool definitions mid-conversation invalidates that cache, and the resulting miss can cost more tokens than the definitions you removed." A client must also treat a cached list as stale the momentlist_changedarrives, even before thettlMsyou advertised. - Progressive tool discovery / code mode - large-catalog clients increasingly use a
search_toolsmeta-tool and programmatic tool calling, wherestructuredContentis consumed outside the model context (client best practices). Curated, well-described tools make these flows work.
Result-Size Budgets (per-client caps)
Clients silently truncate large tool results. Budget for the strictest client you target:
| Client | Default cap | Configurable |
|---|---|---|
| Claude Code | 25,000 tokens (warning at 10k); text results over 50,000 chars are saved to a file and replaced by its path, whatever the token count | MAX_MCP_OUTPUT_TOKENS env; per-tool _meta["anthropic/maxResultSizeChars"] raises the 50k persist threshold up to 500,000 chars and replaces the token cap for text rather than being bounded by it |
| OpenAI Codex CLI | 10,000 tokens on every current model (~40KB); bytes-mode 10,000 survives only on legacy gpt-5.2 and as the unknown-model fallback |
tool_output_token_limit config |
| Gemini CLI | 40,000 chars (head 20% / tail 80% trim; full output saved to a file) | settings; 0 or negative disables |
Enforce your own cap server-side - see "Result-Size Budgets and Truncation" in references/tool-schema-guide.md. Two rules worth stating here: never truncate isError results (payment/auth challenges must survive intact) - and keep them small, because Claude Code itself cuts error text longer than ~11,000 chars to its first and last 5,000 - and treat client budgets as per-connection properties - accept them as URL query params (?max_chars=, alongside ?tools=) rather than growing every tool schema with override args.
Long-Running Tools
Claude Code runs three separate clocks, and only one of them responds to progress:
| Clock | Default | Progress resets it? |
|---|---|---|
Per-server timeout |
"a hard wall-clock limit per tool call" (~28h if unset) | No |
| Idle timeout | 5 min HTTP, 30 min stdio (CLAUDE_CODE_MCP_TOOL_IDLE_TIMEOUT) |
Yes - a call with no response and no progress for the window aborts |
| First-byte timer (HTTP only) | max(60 s, tool timeout, MCP_TIMEOUT) |
n/a - covers each request up to its first response byte |
So emit notifications/progress on slow calls (it keeps the idle timer alive), but don't expect it to buy time past the wall clock. The first-byte timer bites enableJsonResponse: true: a JSON-mode response sends no bytes until the tool finishes, while an SSE response starts streaming immediately. A main-conversation call still running after two minutes is moved to a background task, so a slow tool no longer blocks the session - but it still has to finish.
Design past the cap: return quickly with a server-minted handle and let the caller poll (see "Stateful Tools"), or adopt the io.modelcontextprotocol/tasks extension, which is built for exactly this and returns a CreateTaskResult the client polls via tasks/get. Tasks is per-request opt-in - a server that cannot service a call synchronously for a client that did not declare the tasks capability MUST return -32021 (Missing Required Client Capability) naming the extension, not silently block.
No-Parameter Tools
For tools with no inputs, use an explicit empty schema - not undefined or omission:
inputSchema: { type: "object" as const, additionalProperties: false }
Security
Top Threats (real-world incidents, 2025-2026)
| Attack | Example | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|
| Tool poisoning | Hidden instructions in descriptions (WhatsApp MCP, Apr 2025) | Review tool descriptions; clients should display them |
| Supply chain | Malicious npm packages (Smithery breach, Oct 2025) | Pin versions, audit dependencies |
| Stdio config injection | User-controlled input reaches StdioServerParameters unsanitized (OX Security, 2026-04-15) |
Sanitize stdio config in client code; prefer first-party servers. Treated as "by design" - not patched in the SDK |
| Cross-server shadowing | Malicious server overrides legitimate tool names | Service-prefix tool names; validate tool sources |
| Token theft | Over-privileged PATs with broad scopes | Minimal scopes; OAuth 2.1 Resource Indicators (RFC 8707) |
| Token passthrough | Server accepts/forwards tokens not issued for it | Validate audience claim; never transit client tokens to upstream APIs |
| Confused deputy | Proxy server consent cookies exploited via DCR | Per-client consent before forwarding to third-party auth |
| Session hijacking | Stolen/guessed session IDs for impersonation | Cryptographically random IDs, bind to user identity, never use for auth |
| Cross-client response leak | Shared McpServer/transport reused across clients (CVE-2026-25536, affects v1.10.0-1.25.3) |
Require SDK >= v1.26.0; per-request server+transport |
| Wrong-audience tokens | SDK bearer auth accepted tokens issued for another service (GHSA-rvq5-wwqv-78pq, sdk <= 1.31.0, server <= 2.2.0) | Upgrade and set expectedResource - it is off by default |
| Cross-session task access | v1 experimental tasks not bound to their session (GHSA-22jm-h49p-29qw, sdk 1.24.0-1.31.0 with a taskStore) |
sdk >= 1.32.0; tasks stay shared on stateless servers - authorize every task request |
| UriTemplate ReDoS | Malicious URI patterns (CVE-2026-0621) | Upgrade to v1.25.2+ / v2.0.0-alpha.1+ |
Version floor: @modelcontextprotocol/sdk >= 1.32.0, @modelcontextprotocol/server >= 2.3.0 (plus /express >= 2.0.2 if you use its auth middleware). Two more advisories from the same week are client-side (credentials sent to a server-chosen authorization server, cross-origin redirects) - see references/security-auth.md.
Generic hygiene still applies: validate inputs at tool boundaries, enforce per-user access control, rate limit, sanitize tool outputs, never interpolate tool input into shell commands, block private IPs on outbound fetches, bind local servers to 127.0.0.1. Bound argument size with new McpServer(info, { maxToolInputElements: 10_000 }) (sdk 1.32.0 / server 2.3.0, off by default): an oversized call gets an isError result before schema validation runs.
Server-Side Requirements (spec normative)
- Validate the
Originheader - but only reject when it is present and invalid: "If theOriginheader is present and invalid, servers MUST respond" with 403. Shipping clients exist that send noOriginat all; a blanket 403-on-missing locks them out. - Turn the checks on. Nothing validates
Host/Originunless you put it there:createMcpHandleris validation-free by design. A bareexport default handleron Workers/Deno/Bun is unguarded (#2844). Front it withhostHeaderValidationResponse/originValidationResponse.- The raw transport's
enableDnsRebindingProtectiondefaults tofalse, and the option, along withallowedOrigins/allowedHosts, is@deprecatedin favor of external middleware. createMcpExpressApp/createMcpHonoAppvalidate Host and Origin by default only for loopback binds. Bound to any other specific host (192.168.1.10,mcp.internal), they silently skip both checks (#2843). PassallowedHostsexplicitly.allowedOriginsaccepts<scheme>://*(e.g.moz-extension://*) for browser-extension clients since 2.3.0.
MCP-Protocol-Versionis not optional on a modern wire. The header survived the sessionless overhaul: "Every POST request to the MCP endpoint MUST include anMCP-Protocol-Versionheader", and its value MUST matchio.modelcontextprotocol/protocolVersionin the body's_metaor the server MUST answer400 Bad Requestwith aHeaderMismatcherror. The version rides_metaand the header, redundantly and on purpose - intermediaries route on the header while the server executes on the body, so both must agree.- Be lenient about which version, not about whether it is declared. On 2025-era wires accept a range of declared versions rather than enforcing one - clients advertising
2024-11-05are still in the wild, and a server supporting pre-2025-06-18clients MAY treat a header-less request as2025-03-26. A server that does not support those clients MUST reject a header-less request.
Auth (OAuth 2.1)
MCP normatively requires OAuth 2.1 (draft-ietf-oauth-v2-1-13), not 2.0 - PKCE mandatory, implicit flow removed. Servers are Resource Servers; clients MUST send Resource Indicators (RFC 8707) binding tokens to your server.
- Validate audience - reject tokens not issued for your server (passthrough is forbidden). With the SDK's
requireBearerAuththis meansexpectedResource: new URL("https://mcp.example.com/mcp")and a verifier that fillsAuthInfo.resourcefrom the token'saud- set only the first and every request gets 401; set neither and audience is never checked. PKCES256, short-lived tokens, minimal scopes (elevate per tool withscopeChallenge: requireScopes(...), server >= 2.1.0). - Optional auth splits clients. If one endpoint serves both anonymous and signed-in users, some clients only start OAuth after a
401, so a server that answers credential-lesstools/listwith200leaves them connected anonymously - "connected, N tools" is not evidence of authentication. A blanket 401 gate in turn breaks payment clients that expect a200+isErrorchallenge. Pick deliberately, per endpoint. - Use a tested validation library (Keycloak, Auth0, ...) - don't roll your own; never log Authorization headers/tokens/secrets.
- RFC 9207
issinterop footgun: advertisingauthorization_response_iss_parameter_supported: truemakes strict clients MUST-validate a callbackissthat some of them drop. Advertise the flag asfalsewhile still sendingiss- seereferences/security-auth.md.
For full security attack/mitigation patterns and auth implementation details: see
references/security-auth.md
Known SDK Bugs
Must-know as of sdk@1.32.1 / server@2.3.1:
z.union()/z.discriminatedUnion()silently produce empty schemas on every released v1, v1.32.1 included (#1643, backport PR #2017 still open) - use flatz.object()+z.enum().- Security floor is sdk >= 1.32.0 / server >= 2.3.0 - see the threat table above.
- Register before
connect()on v1. Later registration throws on every released v1 (#893; the v1 fix is merged but unreleased after 1.32.1). On v2 it works once the capability is declared in the constructor'scapabilities. - Client AJV strict rejects unstripped
structuredContentextras -.parse()upstream data first, or.passthrough()for intentional extras. - v1 stamps every tool schema
"$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#"(still true on 1.32.1), and a strict 2020-12 client rejects the whole tool: "JSON Schema declares an unsupported dialect ... The default validator supports JSON Schema 2020-12 only." One bad schema can take the server's other tools down with it in clients that drop the wholetools/list. v2 emits 2020-12. Open (#2721, canonical #2084);@modelcontextprotocol/inspector>= 2.4.0 flags it for you. - Reusing a server or stateless transport is a hard error since
server@2.3.0(a minor release).createMcpHandler(() => sharedServer)answers overlapping requests with500/-32603; a reused stateless transport throws on the second request. Through the Node wrapper it is a bare, empty500with nothing in your logs (#2704). Pass a factory that builds the server.
Full table (statuses, zod 3->4 dropping
additionalProperties,refine/superRefinenever running, transport-closure stack overflow, HTTP/2, raw JSON Schema,z.transform(), ReDoS, the 2.1-2.3 fixes): seereferences/sdk-bugs.md
V2 Migration
For comprehensive migration guide with all breaking changes and before/after code: see
references/v2-migration.md
Key breaking changes:
- Package split:
@modelcontextprotocol/sdk->@modelcontextprotocol/server+/client+/core - ESM-first (CJS builds restored in beta.2), Node.js 20+ (Bun/Deno supported)
- Zod v4 required (or any Standard Schema library)
McpError->ProtocolError(from@modelcontextprotocol/core)extraparameter -> structuredctxwithctx.mcpReqserver.tool()->registerTool()(config object, not positional args)- SSE server transport removed (clients can still connect to legacy SSE servers)
createMcpHandler(factory)replaces per-request transport +connect()wiring;@modelcontextprotocol/hono/express/nodeadapt it- DNS rebinding protection enabled by default for localhost servers (framework factories only)
v1.x gets fixes until at least 2027-01-27 but will never implement 2026-07-28 - write new code on v2.
Spec 2026-07-28 (released)
Published 2026-07-28 (release announcement, changelog) - now the latest revision. Remember it is opt-in on the SDK (see "The Two Eras"): 2025-11-25 remains what most deployed software speaks.
Four shifts that change a decision you make today:
- MCP is stateless and sessionless. The
initializehandshake andMcp-Session-Idare gone (SEP-2575, SEP-2567); every request carries its protocol version, client identity, and capabilities in_meta, and cross-call state uses handles (see "Stateful Tools"). Do not build new servers on session affinity. server/discoveris a server MUST - it advertises versions/capabilities/identity; clients MAY skip it and handleUnsupportedProtocolVersionErrorinline.- Roots, Sampling, Logging, and the HTTP+SSE transport are Deprecated under a formal feature lifecycle (SEP-2577/SEP-2596). They still work; design new servers without them. HTTP+SSE's own clock is shorter than the default 12 months - it became eligible for removal around 2026-09-03.
- Allocate application-defined error codes outside
-32768..-32000--32020..-32099is reserved for the spec and-32000..-32019is legacy that new implementations SHOULD NOT use at all (PR #2907).
The content vs structuredContent dual-delivery footgun is unchanged - no precedence rule landed, so the guidance above still holds.
Everything else - MRTR,
subscriptions/listen,_metaidentity keys,requestState,Mcp-Method/Mcp-Name, cacheable results, per-request log level, auth changes, the removals (SSE resumability,ping,execution.taskSupport), era testing, working groups: seereferences/spec-2026-07-28.md
Extensions
Optional, strictly additive capabilities named {vendor-prefix}/{extension-name} (official: io.modelcontextprotocol/*; third-party: reversed domain). Negotiated in initialize capabilities on 2025-era wires; on 2026-07-28 clients advertise support per request in _meta["io.modelcontextprotocol/clientCapabilities"]. Official ones: MCP Apps (/ui, interactive HTML UIs, Stable, widely supported; ext-apps 2.0.0 since 2026-09-08 - breaking on the TypeScript side only, the wire protocol is unchanged), OAuth Client Credentials (Draft), Enterprise-Managed Authorization (Stable 2026-06-18), Tasks (official since 2026-08-19), Skills (io.modelcontextprotocol/skills, SEP-2640 Final - skills served as resources) - client matrix.
Server capabilities beyond tools (2025-era call style unless noted):
| Capability | Purpose | v2 API |
|---|---|---|
| Elicitation | Request structured user input mid-tool | Both eras: return inputRequired({ inputRequests: { k: inputRequired.elicit(...) } }). ctx.mcpReq.elicitInput() throws on a 2026-07-28 connection |
| Sampling | Request LLM completion from client | ctx.mcpReq.requestSampling() |
| Tasks | Long-running ops with lifecycle management | Official extension (SEP-2663) |
| Progress | Incremental progress on requests | ctx.mcpReq.sendProgress() |
On 2026-07-28 servers cannot send requests to clients at all: elicitation and sampling go through MRTR (return an InputRequiredResult, read inputResponses on the retry). Write handlers in the inputRequired style: the SDK's default legacy shim turns the returned request into a real elicitation/create for 2025-era clients, so one handler serves both eras. Tasks moved out of core into the polled io.modelcontextprotocol/tasks extension (ext-tasks).
For MCP Apps architecture, ext-apps SDK, and build patterns: see
references/mcp-apps.mdFor the extensions system, auth extensions, elicitation/sampling/tasks detail, and the MCP Registry: seereferences/extensions-registry.md
