Redis Security
Production hardening for Redis: authentication, ACL-based access control, and network exposure. Cover all three together — any one of them on its own leaves an exploitable gap.
When to apply
- Deploying or reviewing a Redis instance destined for production.
- Setting up application credentials beyond a shared password.
- Auditing a Redis deployment against a security checklist.
- Receiving "Redis exposed to the internet" findings from a scanner.
1. Always authenticate (and use TLS)
Never run a production Redis without a password. Pair authentication with TLS so credentials and data aren't sent in clear text.
# redis.conf
requirepass your-strong-password
tls-port 6380
tls-cert-file /path/to/redis.crt
tls-key-file /path/to/redis.key
r = redis.Redis(
host="localhost",
port=6380,
password="your-strong-password",
ssl=True,
ssl_cert_reqs="required",
)
If you can use ACL users (next section) instead of the single requirepass, do — requirepass is effectively the legacy "default user" shortcut.
See references/auth.md.
2. ACLs for least-privilege access
The default user with a shared password is fine for development. For production, give each application a dedicated ACL user with only the commands and key patterns it actually needs.
# Cache-only reader
ACL SETUSER app_readonly on >password ~cache:* +get +mget +scan
# Writer that can't run dangerous ops
ACL SETUSER app_writer on >password ~* +@all -@dangerous
# Admin (use sparingly, never for application traffic)
ACL SETUSER admin on >strong-password ~* +@all
Useful command categories:
| Category | What it covers |
|---|---|
@read |
Read commands (GET, MGET, HGET, ...) |
@write |
Write commands (SET, DEL, XADD, ...) |
@dangerous |
FLUSHALL, DEBUG, KEYS, etc. |
@admin |
Administrative commands |
If app credentials leak, a tight ACL bounds the blast radius — the attacker can't FLUSHALL your DB just because they grabbed a cache reader's password.
See references/acls.md.
3. Restrict network access
The most common Redis breach is a public-internet Redis with no auth. Avoid that with three layers:
# redis.conf — bind to specific interfaces, keep protected-mode on
bind 127.0.0.1 192.168.1.100
protected-mode yes
# Firewall — allow only application subnets
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 6379 -s 192.168.1.0/24 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 6379 -j DROP
Anti-pattern: bind 0.0.0.0 + protected-mode no — exposes Redis to the whole network without protection.
Optional but recommended: rename or disable destructive commands so a compromised client can't trash the DB:
rename-command FLUSHALL ""
rename-command DEBUG ""
rename-command CONFIG ""