Skill: forensic-audit

Trigger

Use this skill when the user invokes /forensic-audit, asks to run a "forensic audit", "forensic audit pipeline", "multi-pass audit", "security audit", "vulnerability scan", "security check", or "code vulnerability scan".

Description

Three-phase read-only forensic audit of a codebase. Each phase is written to a timestamped report file before the next phase begins. Reports are saved to %USERPROFILE%\Desktop\_Reports\<timestamp>\.

STRICT READ-ONLY: Never modify, refactor, or create any files inside the project repository. Only write to the _Reports output folder.

Execution Protocol

Pre-flight (before any phase)

1. Resolve output path: $outDir = "$env:USERPROFILE\Desktop\_Reports\$(Get-Date -Format 'yyyy-MM-dd_HHmm')" — new timestamped subfolder every run to preserve previous audits.
2. Create output dir: mkdir -p "$outDir" (or equivalent PowerShell command) — confirm creation, abort if it fails.
3. Capture repo context (embed in every report header):
   • Current directory (repo root)
   • git rev-parse --short HEAD — git hash
   • git branch --show-current — branch name
   • git status --short — dirty/clean state
4. Quick signal scan (run before Phase 1 to orient findings): Use the grep_search tool (or run_command to run rg):

   # Unbounded queries
   rg "\.findMany\(\)" --type ts -l
   
   # Potential hardcoded secrets
   rg -i "password\s*=\s*['\"][^'\"]{4,}|api_key\s*=\s*['\"]|secret\s*=\s*['\"]" --type ts -l
   
   # Missing await / fire-and-forget risks
   rg "^\s*[^/].*\bprisma\." --type ts -l | head -20
   
   # console.log with sensitive-looking data
   rg "console\.(log|error)\(.*?(token|password|secret|hash)" --type ts -l
   
   # TODO / FIXME / HACK markers
   rg "TODO|FIXME|HACK|XXX" --type ts
   

5. Directory snapshot: rg --files apps/api/src | sort — full source tree before Phase 1.

Report Header Template (prepend to every phase file)

# [Phase Title]
**Date**: YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM
**Repo**: [repo root path]
**Git HEAD**: [short hash] ([branch])
**Dirty files**: [output of git status --short, or "clean"]
**Auditor role**: [role for this phase]
---

Phase 1 — Security, Cryptography & Data Privacy

Role: Senior Cybersecurity Expert (OWASP), Cryptographer, EU DPO.

Audit scope — read the relevant source files using view_file or search via grep_search, then write findings:

PASS 1: Authentication & Privilege Escalation

• POST /register: guard preventing unauthenticated users from passing role: "ADMIN" or role: "OPERATOR" in the payload?
• JWT plugin: secrets verified against empty/default fallbacks? Expiration enforced? Refresh token rotation (RTR) atomic and replay-safe?
• TOTP /totp/verify: lastUsedTotpCode stored to prevent 30-second replay attacks?

PASS 2: Authorization & IDOR

• Every business route: explicit auth hook (preHandler: [app.authenticate])? Unprotected endpoints?
• CLIENT-scoped endpoints (GET /api/queue/:id, POST /api/appointments, POST /api/sessions/:id/feedback): strict ownership validation, or IDOR via ID swap?

PASS 3: Rate Limiting & Brute Force

• /login, /register, /forgot-password, /reset-password, /totp/verify: is rateLimit config present? What are the limits? Are they adequate?
• Missing rate limit on any auth-adjacent endpoint = HIGH finding.

PASS 4: Cryptographic Practices & Secret Hygiene

• AES-256-GCM helper (crypto.ts): key length verified at startup? authTag and iv correctly stored/decrypted?
• Desktop credential storage: plaintext JSON in %APPDATA% or Electron safeStorage?
• GET /clients and similar: sensitive fields (encrypted passwords, raw tokens, hashes) explicitly excluded from Prisma select?
• Hardcoded secrets scan: any API keys, tokens, or passwords committed directly in source (.ts, .js, .env.* tracked by git)?
• console.log / app.log calls that print tokens, hashes, or raw PII?

PASS 5: Stripe Webhook Security

• /webhooks/stripe: webhook signature verified via stripe.webhooks.constructEvent? What happens if STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET is missing?
• Is the raw body preserved (not parsed as JSON) before signature check?
• Does the handler log Stripe event payloads in a way that could expose customer PII?

PASS 6: GDPR / DSGVO Compliance

• Account deletion (POST /api/dsgvo/delete-account): cascade deletes/anonymizes orphaned Client PII (names, addresses, RustDesk access data)?
• Session consent handler: logs immutable metadata (IP, timestamp, clientId) confirming explicit consent before remote control?
• Data export (GET /api/dsgvo/export): does it include all personal data per Art. 20? Is the download URL scoped to the requesting user?

Output format:

## 1. Executive Summary (Security Focus)
## 2. Top Critical Security Vulnerabilities
## 3. Detailed Severity Breakdown

### CRITICAL findings
[file:line] CRITICAL — [problem]
\```diff
- before
+ after
\```

### HIGH findings
...

### MEDIUM findings
...

## 4. Severity Count
CRITICAL: N | HIGH: N | MEDIUM: N

Every finding: [file:line] Severity — problem + targeted before/after diff (≤30 lines context). No full-file rewrites. No deletion of validation/.refine() blocks.

Write result to: $outDir\audit_1_security.md

Verify write: check file exists and size > 500 bytes. If empty or missing — do not proceed, report error.

Phase 2 — Database Integrity, Transactions & Performance

Role: Principal DBA, Prisma ORM Expert, Performance Engineer.

Fresh file-system pass — re-read source files independently, do not rely on Phase 1 memory.

Cross-phase dedup rule: if a finding was already reported in audit_1_security.md, write → see Phase 1: [brief label] instead of repeating the full diff.

PASS 1: Concurrency, Race Conditions & Isolation Levels

• Queue accept (POST /api/queue/:id/accept): atomic Prisma transaction preventing two operators from accepting the same client simultaneously?
• Voucher / appointment booking: SERIALIZABLE isolation with retry loop, or READ COMMITTED phantom-read risk?
• Any findUnique + conditional update pair outside a transaction (TOCTOU race)?

PASS 2: Prisma Optimization & N+1 Queries

• Admin metrics / dashboard (GET /api/admin/metrics, GET /api/stats): sequential loops or unbatched Promise.all? Consolidate to raw SQL or optimal include/select?
• Unbounded findMany() calls without take/skip/cursor — list every occurrence with file:line.
• include loading full relations when only a count or single field is needed?

PASS 3: Database Integrity & Indexes

• Compare queries in route files against schema.prisma: fields used in where/orderBy/joins — do they have @@index or @unique, or will they trigger full table scans?
• onDelete actions: RESTRICT blocking standard deletes, or accidental CASCADE wiping analytics logs?
• Missing unique constraints that should logically be unique (e.g., one active subscription per user)?

PASS 4: I/O, SSE & Connection Pooling

• SSE infrastructure (queue-sse.ts): close event removes listeners? Memory/socket leaks under reconnection storms?
• Prisma connection limit (connection_limit in DATABASE_URL) vs Fastify concurrent load?
• Long-running un-awaited promises that hold Prisma connections open?

Output format:

## 1. Database & Performance Summary
## 2. Concurrency & Race Condition Pitfalls
## 3. Query & Index Optimization Breakdown (with Diffs)

## 4. Severity Count
HIGH: N | MEDIUM: N | LOW: N

Write result to: $outDir\audit_2_database.md

Verify write: check file exists and size > 500 bytes. If empty or missing — do not proceed, report error.

Phase 3 — Architecture, SOLID, Resilience & Lifecycle

Role: Senior Software Architect, SRE, QA Automation Lead.

Fresh file-system pass. Cross-phase dedup: if already in Phase 1 or 2 — reference it, don't repeat.

PASS 1: Logic, Timezones & Cron Lifecycles

• Background cron jobs (proactive-outreach.ts, index.ts): DST-safe? Europe/Berlin autumn/spring shifts handled without double-fire or skip?
• Schedule validation (schedule.ts): raw string comparisons ("09:00" < "17:00")? Midnight crossovers? Night shifts (e.g., 22:00–06:00)?
• Batch cron loops: local try/catch per item, or one error aborts the entire batch for all remaining clients?

PASS 2: Architecture Purity & SOLID

• Route/controller files: direct DB + Stripe + Twilio calls without a service layer? List files where transport and business logic are mixed.
• Fastify plugins (Prisma, Stripe): wrapped in fastify-plugin (fp)? onClose lifecycle hooks registered?
• Single Responsibility: any one file doing >3 distinct concerns?

PASS 3: Infrastructure, Error Handling & Configuration

• Env-var wrappers (mailer.ts, twilio.ts): silent dry-run fallback in prod when var is missing, or safe startup crash?
• Error handlers: structured JSON logs, or raw stack traces / SQL query fragments exposed to client response?
• Missing startup validation: does the server fail fast with a clear message if JWT_SECRET, DATABASE_URL, or STRIPE_SECRET_KEY are absent?

PASS 4: Electron Lifecycle & Test Runner Isolation

• Desktop IPC bridges: arbitrary node module invocation possible via IPC? before-quit blocking synchronous network calls?
• contextIsolation and nodeIntegration settings in BrowserWindow config?
• Test suite: app.inject() in-process testing, or real localhost HTTP calls against a running server?
• Test mocks: any test that reaches a real DB, network, or filesystem without explicit opt-in?

Output format:

## 1. Architectural & Resilience Overview
## 2. Critical Lifecycle & Logic Issues
## 3. Structural Refactoring & Testability Breakdown (with Diffs)

## 4. Severity Count
HIGH: N | MEDIUM: N | LOW: N

Write result to: $outDir\audit_3_architecture.md

Completion

After all three files are written and verified, output to chat:

Forensic audit completed. Saved to: [outDir]

Created files:
- audit_1_security.md
- audit_2_database.md
- audit_3_architecture.md

Then provide a 3-sentence executive summary — one sentence per phase, each naming the single highest-severity finding and its file:line.

Finally, output a combined severity table:

| Phase       | CRITICAL | HIGH | MEDIUM | LOW |
|-------------|----------|------|--------|-----|
| Security    |        N |    N |      N |   N |
| Database    |        — |    N |      N |   N |
| Architecture|        — |    N |      N |   N |
| TOTAL       |        N |    N |      N |   N |

Constraints (apply to all phases)

• READ-ONLY on project source. Zero writes, edits, or new git branches inside the repository.
• Timestamped output — never overwrite previous audit runs.
• Report header required — every file must start with date, git hash, branch, dirty state.
• File write verification — confirm each phase file is > 500 bytes before proceeding to the next phase.
• No full-file rewrites in reports. Diffs must be targeted (≤30 lines context).
• No destructive fixes: never suggest deleting validation or .refine() blocks. Fixes must extend business logic algorithmically.
• Fault tolerance: no top-level throw Error fixes that crash Electron / desktop clients. Always propose architectural fallbacks.
• Cross-phase dedup: Phase 2 and 3 must reference Phase 1 findings rather than duplicate them.
• Sequential phases: Phase N+1 starts only after Phase N file is confirmed written and non-empty.
• Permission Handling: If you do not have permission to write directly to %USERPROFILE%\Desktop\_Reports, request it using ask_permission for write_file with target C:\Users\relig\Desktop or execute the file write operations via the run_command tool in PowerShell.